Cooper, White. and Lauber 131 analyzed jet-transport accidents worldwide for the period 1968 to 1976 and found more than 60 in which breakdowns of the crew-performance and decision-making process played a pivotal role. It is the contention of this paper that the results reported by Cooper, et al., are related to fatigue and that fatigue is related to sleep deprivation. circadian desynchronosis. and lack of good nutrition. It is further argued, and supporting research is cited, that fatigue does not cause loss of skill in flying the aircraft but inay have disastrous effects on judgmental and decision making functions.
INTRODUCTION
Because of the extreme difficulty in investigating human behavior u f i~r an accident, the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) was brought into being in order to reveal and anticipate unsafe trends and their possible causes. This paper will attempt to demonstrate, based on ASRSreported information. that the majority of errors made by aircrew members are cognitive errors. not control errors, and that a major contributing factor is fatigue. It is widely accepted that poor crew resource management. distractions, and lack of information transfer contribute to human error. Fatigued pilots are more prone to distraction and seem to suffer from a narrowing of perceptual focus. reserving their attention for issues of aircraft control such ah hzading, airspeed. and altitude. It is further argued that fatigue is increased by sleep deprivation. circadian desynchronosis, and poor nutrition that may accompany current air carrier scheduling practices.
A request was submitted to the Aviation Safety Reporting System office for a search for all incident reports that mentioned fatigue. These were rcwiewed and the findings formed the basis for this report. Many of the narratives in these ASRS reports were completed by the phrase " _ . .and we were tired.'' indicating fatigue was a factor in the incident. Discussions with commercial airline flight-crew members revealed that the scheduling practices of some airlines can result in aircrews receiving less than six hours of sleep, having indefinite eating schedules and no scheduled breaks. These situations can cause fatigue which can then result in flight crew error. Errors lead to incidents which can lead to accidents if the circumstance, and timing coincide. Graeber [ 1 ] discussed "External Factors Affecting Pilot Decisions" in a paper presented to the Orient Airline Association Annual Flight Safety Seminar in 1987. He stated that: "the cockpit crew consistently accounts for almost 70% of all worldwide accidents (Figure 1 ). He also stated: "D.A. Norman pointed out that human error can be divided into two types: slips and mistakes. While slips consist of errors of execution, mistakes represent errors of intention. It is primarily this intentional type of error that is usually involved in errors of judgment or variation from established procedures." Figure 2 shows these are two most frequently cited causal factors in flight crew accidents. It is clear from the foregoing statistics that improvements in pilot decision skills potentially offer the largest pay-off in unproved safety.
John Lauber, a human factors researcher and NTSB member \tared 121 .' . . . analysis of aviation accidents and incidents reveals that, in general. the human error involved has less to d o with switches. knobs and dials, and is more likely to involve fairly high level kinds of behavior-things like judgment, decision making, cognition, and perception." The purpose of this paper is to explore and report some factors that can influence decision-making and judgmental activities on the flight deck.
A IPPROACH
The Aviation Safety Reporting System is an incidentreporting system managed by NASA for the FAA. Reports are submitted voluntarily by pilots or controllers for two reasons: first. to report a safety problem; and second, to receive limited inimunity from legal actions that may result from the described incident. At the time of this search. 40.286 full-form records h;id been received since January 1986. The requested incident reports that mentioned flight crew fatigue numbered 281. In I ',80. Ames human factors researchers analyzed 2,006 reports received since 1076 and found 426 ( 2 I . I % ) that rnentioned factors directly or indirectly related to fatigue. ASRS personnel [4] state that: "This voluntary system cannot be used to infer frequency or prevalence of problems in the aviation erivironment. If a large volume of reports can be obtained. however, the probability is high that it provides much useful information concerning the problems and perhaps some useful insights into the causes of those problems." The objective of tbis paper is to increase the aviation industry awareness about the underlying causes of flawed decisions pilots are making. The paper will suggest that most errors are cognitive and that cognitive errors are frequently fatigue-induced. It is hoped tliat both industry and government will respond by initiating appropriate research studies to further define the relevant parameters and develop procedures and regulations that are bssed on objective and valid findings. Figure 3 ) and stated that "failures of control were rare. suggesting ASRS reporters do not have difficulty making the aircraft do what they want it to do and go where they want it to go. Decision-making and cockpit r'esource management errors were frequent . . . over 7 0 9 of reports are found to involve a failure of information transfer."
The work of Bartlett (cited by Foushee. et al. (41) is commonly cited as one of the major contributions to the literature on complex task fatigue. In this body ofwork (often referred to as the Cambridge Cockpit Studies) subjects were exposed to tasks which consisted of responding on aircraft-type controls to "changes" in a variety of instruments. Fatigue was manipulated by exposure to these tasks over long periods of time. The findings of these studies seemed to indicate that as alertness declined. progressively larger "deviations" were tolerated before any corrective actions were taken by subjects. It appeared that fatigued subjects were more prone to distraction and seemed to suffer from a narrowing of perceptual focus such that attention was reserved for items of more central importance, such as heading and airspeed indicators. It was further observed that performance on these tasks became more variable, as opposed to less accurate. Moreover, subjective observations indicated that subjects became more irritable with increasing fatigue ("violent" language, etc.).
G .C. Drew [SI performed "An Experimental Study of Mental
Fatigue" in I940 in an old Spitfire cockpit with the instrument panel designed so that the airmen could follow and obey the general principles of instrument flying. The airmen were required to fly courses which consisted of four maneuvers repeated at given time intervals for the duration of their test. They were also required to monitor temperature and pressure for the various gauges, and correct them if they should change.
The four maneuvers, after stablizing at a heading of 0 IO degrees and 8.500 feet. were: ( I ) A dive of 3,500 feet at the rate of 3.500 feetiminute; (2) a standard rate turn to the right through 210 degrees; ( 3 ) a climb of 3,500 at 3,500 feetiminute; and (4) a standard rate turn to the left through 210 degrees, in that order. The four maneuvers comprised one unit of behavior. The work included two units without a break. a level flying period, two units. a level flying period, two units, and a landing to complete the session. This plus the initial practice and explanation occupied a good two hours. Apart from "flying" the simulator, the 140 pilot-subjects were required to keep a check on six temperature and pressure gauges and also a fuel indicator. There were a few omissions during the first four units, but a sharply increasing number from the fifth. The researcher interpreted this result in terms of a narrowing of attention in order to maintain performance on the main flying task. The researcher went on to report that: '' . . . with the exception of the petrol gauge, none of the gauges carried any indication of the correct reading, so that even when the subjects did look at these gauges when they were tired, they were unable to remember what the correct temperatures and pressures should be, and so refused to react to them. The undercarriage switches were also frequently overlooked by the fatigued pilot. It was, in fact, one of the most common of all faults for the pilot to land with the undercarriage up and explain that he had completely forgotten about it. In fact, more than 80 of the 140 pilots tested landed with the undercarriage up. It was thought possible that fatigue represented an increasing distrdctabihty, a progressive inability to concentrate on the task in hand."
Communications and Crew Coordination
The failure to use measures of higher-order cognitive functions in Drew's and other studies ignores the relatively stable effects of fatigue such as increased irritability. For example. the increased irritability associated with fatigue makes it more difficult for crew members to work together effectively. Thus, fatigue effects may not be apparent on individual performance parameters but significant with respect to group performance. Drew reported that irritability is shown in two ways, first by the constant flow of oaths, and second. by an incrcasingly violent manipulation of controls, a fatigued pilot starts over-correctins because he is feeling irritable and his over-corrections make him more irritable. For instance. it is well known that the psychophysiological state of a person is directly tied to his or her emotional state. Likewise, it should be expected that the relative emotional states of group members, such as irritability and tiredness. can affect many of the dimensions related to group function. These include leader-subordinate relationships, leadership styles, the personality structures of group members, and communication patterns within the group. It is becoming increasingly apparent that these factors sometimes interact to produce breakdowns in the crew coordination process. See reference 6. for example. 
SLEEP QUALITY
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A pilots ability to meet duty requirements could conceivably be influenced by his subjective impression of how well he has slept. In general, evidence from the literature [6] indicates minimal adverse effects of acute or chronic sleep reduction on psychological performance and subjective or objective nieasures of daytime s l e e p u n l e s s sleep is restricted to less than about 6 hours a day. A workshop 171 on "Pilot Fatigue and Circadian Desynchronosis" was held in I980 to assist NASA in responding to a Congressional request to determine whether "jet lag" was a concern. was there any valid reason to look at it, and which agency should be doing it. The participants included university, military and other federal agency scientists, pilots, and airline management representatives. It was agreed that extensive literature exists that provides evidence that fatigue is increased (or performance degraded) in association with: 1. Sleep loss or deprivation and alteration of habitual sleepi 2. Circadian desynchronosis associated with time-zonc 3. Long duty hours; and 4 . Less than optimal nutrition. wake cycles; changes and irregularity of workirest cycles;
CIRCADIAN DESYNCHRONOSIS
There is little doubt that the amount of sleep obtainable. even under ideal environmental circumstances, will depend cln when sleep is attempted and its relationship to circadian rhythm. If sleep is attempted when the body temperature is rising, the crew member-will have considerably more difficulty getting to sleep and, if successful, will usually awaken within a relatively short time. Consequently, the timing of a layover and the adequacy of accommodations for obtaining sleep at any local time of day may be more critical than layover length for assuring proper rest before departure. If sleep loss is inevitable, appropriate sleep time (relative to the biological clock) should be allowed before the next scheduled flight. The types of body-clock problems aircrews ire experiencing are llustrated in the following three ASRS reports.
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Thr first report .stcite.\ : Somehow we are supposed to shift from a morning to late night schedule in 1 1 hours layover time . . . I never get more than 4 hours sleep, usually less, and the same is true for the captain and flight attendants. I hate to think how many accidents have occurred due to this type of scheduling. Would you put your family on an all night flight wondering how functional the crew is'? (92578) The srcmd report stutes: I completed a minimum crew rest, and the next day my duty day was 13:4S hours. Both my first officer and myself are showing signs of fatigue. I am unable to concentrate, cannot repeat clearances back if they contain more than 2 bits or information, and I cannot even remember my flight number. I have had trouble with fixation on simple tasks. I am going to take some time off without pay because these effects seem to be cumulative and intensifying with each stressful day. Commonly, I have had to go 18 to 24 hours without eating. Attempts to ensure sleep needs and eating patterns is met with counseling and disciplinary action. (123033) Atid thti third report is (is j o l l o~~s : Everyone is just too tired to perform. The reason I am writing this is because prior to departing LAX, I commented that while the first leg was an unavoidable necessity, adding the second leg by crew schedule is a tired-accident waiting to happen, and foolish economics by the company. The F/O stated that he had been flying this pairing for some time and he had no problem with it, "It's just a matter of getting used to it."On the second leg, I kept a list of the F/O performance as I became aware of it and read it back to him before we left the cockpit in PHL. The flight had been VFR most all of the way from LAX-JFK-PHL, and virtually problem free.
The F/O mixed altitude and heading numbers from departure on read back. FiO missed 4 air traffic calls enroute. F/O selected (never used) 18 degree flaps instead of standard 22 degree flaps. FIE caught the error and verified 22 degree flaps were called. FiO had to be told twice to lower gear. F/O did not initially respond to before landing final checklist read by FIE. After landing during taxi in, the F/O performed and answered the after landing checklist, but the radar was left on normal and the transponder was left on until after the secure cockpit checklist was completed and responded to. I caught them on my final review before leaving my seat. I am certain I missed some things too, as well as some of those by the F/O. We all were tired-too tired to fly safely! The following narrative is representative of the sleep problems aircrews are reporting to NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System. It seems like every time I have 2 long flying days split by a short layover, I have to submit a NASA report for some fatigue related incident. Eight hours behind the door is not long enough. One cannot immediately fall asleep after the completion of a duty period, and that eight hours includes the time to shower and get ready in the morning and ride to the airport. The result is 5 % to 6 hours rest, dangerous! ( 1 57426)
NUTRITION
As the "Pilot Fatigue and Circadian Desynchronosis Workshop" [7] indicated, it is accepted knowledge that fatigue is increased by less than optimal nutrition. The next two ASRS narrative reports reflect a common complaint.
We had been on duty 10 hours and 20 minutes, and we had already logged 8 hours and 5 minutes block-to-block flying time. We had no break in our duty time-not even to get off the airplane-and because it is not company policy to do so, we had nothing to eat. . . (134721) And the second report:
However, I believe that there are several contributing factors.
1)
Fatigue: the day of this occurrence was the 3rd day of a 4 day trip. At the time it happened we had just finished 7:37 hours of flight time. All 4 days required an early wake up. The captain and copilot had both slept badly the night before because of the unusual sleep pattern and outside noise at the hotel. Also contributing to fatigue was the fact that we had no opportunity to eat since the night before. The airline company doesn't feed their own family! ( I 14387).
And,jinally, here is a typical, illustrative ASRS report thut summarizes the many comments uhoutfatiguc thut so frequcvitl. occurred throughout the many reports rcnerid.
I feel falling asleep at the controls on duty has become almost commonplace. . . The scheduled flight times are now unrealistic which cause flight crews to have to hustle to try and maintain an unrealistic schedule which then eliminates any break periods-ven the AAA recommends a rest after two hours driving and here you have crews flying for 5 straight duty hours without a break. No wonder distractions occur . . . I feel the cause of this was extreme crew fatigue. Except for a slight nap that evening, I had been up for over 24 hours. I know I felt "punchy" for example, looking out the window for traffic and being oblivious to everything. including traffic . . . I also saw it in the simple mistakes all 3 of us were making, such as missed radio calls and checklist items. ( 172229) THE NASA STUDIES ked NASA to undertake a comprehensive research program in 1980 to assess whether fatigue related problems are prevalent in long-haul and short-haul flying. Chidester [8] conducted a survey of airline pilots to determine normative patterns and individual differences in mood and sleep during short-haul flying operations. The survey revealed that over the course of a typical 2 day trip, pilots experience a decrease in duration and quality of sleep, and a progressively more negative mood. These patterns are very similar to a high fidelity sleep and monitoring activity study performed by Gander and Graeber [61 which measured the impact of shorthaul operations on sleep. The data suggest that commercial short-haul pilots experience sleep loss during 3-day and 4-day duty cycles.
Foushee, et al., [ 31 performed a full mission simulation study that compared the performance of IO crews who had just completed a 3-day moderate density, short-haul duty cycle with 10 crews who had just had at least 3 days off. The performance of post-duty crews was significantly better than that of pre-duty crews. even though they rated themselves more fatigued. Analyses suggested these results were a function of recentlyshared operating experience which facilitated crew coordination. This countered the fatigue present at the end of a duty cycle. However. the sleep duration in the pilot survey [XI, as well as the monitor study [6] was reported to be 6.8
hours. The amount of sleep the pre-and post-duty crews had on the simulation 131 averaged 7. I hours the two days before the simulation. These studies do not reflect the problems attributed to sleep duration of less than 6 hours currently received by some aircrews. They serve to illustrate the complexity of such studies where experimental control of the relevant variables is of extreme importance particularly in representing the real-world scenarios that are so vividly described in the ASRS reports. It is hoped with the material in this presentation to motivate future studies that more faithfully reconstruct those scenarios.
CONCLUSION
ASRS incident reports indicate some aircrews often receive less than six hours of sleep. experience desynchronosis, and lack of proper nutrition. Research shows that fatigue leads to psychological and physiological problems that cause cognitive error. Accumulated sleep debt and lack of nutrition contribute to fatigue. If aircrews are not scheduled in a manner that allows enough time to obtain proper sleep, synchronize the body to the appropriate time zones, and receive nutrition, they may not be able to effectively use the automatic decision aids designed to increase the safety ot'the National Airspace System. Of what use are these aids if the physiologically and psychologically impoverished pilot, in a "white-knuckle" fixation on needle. ball, and airspeed, ignores or cannot utilize these cognitivelyoriented technical wonders? As Graeber [9] has stated: "The experienced airline pilot possesses a unique aviation background against which to judge computer generated altxnatives as well as those alternatives which are less obvious to in automateddecision aid. Unfortunately, it is precisely the higher level human cognitive skills which are critical for decision making that are most vulnerable to the combined impact of sleep loss, circadian desynchronization, and boredom." It is hoped this paper will alert the aviation technical community to the need for appropriate research studies to gain tht: objective data that might lead to a beneficial change in prsxedures and regulations.
